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I do not intend to summarise the main points from the speakers' papers. I do want to 
establish the nature of the question, why it arises, and some reference points that 
might aid navigation through the day's proceedings.
This year's theme is "what is knowledge?"
We are not interested in the question in the context of traditional epistemology: it is 
not the philosopher's question, although may be a philosophical question.
Rather we ask: "What is "knowledge" in art and design?"
The question is not "what do we know in art and design", such as its history, but "what 
do we mean by the term knowledge in the context of research in art and design?"
Why should one ask such a question?
We share an interest in research in art and design. It is the mission of Research into 
Practice to examine the nature of practice-based research in art and design. If one 
examines the concept of research one encounters concepts such as "the forefront of 
knowledge", "the advancement of knowledge", and "making a contribution to 
knowledge", and the questions arise " how can one advance art and design ", "what is 
a contribution to knowledge"? Before one can answer these questions one must know 
what is the nature of the knowledge that is being advanced.
Research into Practice asks the questions that precede an attempt to answer them
The question "what is knowledge" is the traditional territory of epistemology but 
concepts in this field are sometimes problematic if we attempt to import them directly. 
For example, we might initially want to say that there is only one type of knowledge, 
the type discussed by epistemologists, in which case we have to think what 
corresponds to the epistemologist's "true justified belief" in the field of art and design. 
The fact that this is difficult might lead us to conclude either that there is no such thing 
as knowledge in art and design, or that the knowledge that we have is different. That 
is to say, knowledge may not always be true justified belief.
If we say there is no such thing as knowledge in art and design we may be putting all 
art and design researchers out of business, unless we also have an alternative 
description of what the field of art and design contains, and the relationship of 
research to how the field is advanced.
If we say knowledge in art and design is of a different kind to true justified beliefs, then 
we have to say of what kind of knowledge it is. This in turn might lead us towards 
Ryle's distinction between knowing-how and knowing-that. For example, we might 
begin with a discussion of the value of knowing-how in a practice-led discipline like art 
and design. But is practice-based research only going to lead to advancements in 
practice? Can practice-based research only contribute to advancements in knowing-
how?
We might want to take an alternative approach and consider that the language in 
which these questions are framed is itself inappropriate. By saying this I would 
certainly not want to suggest that terms such as knowledge, argument and evidence 
should be dispensed with altogether. But it is the lesson of post-modernism that the 
  
  
to cite this journal article:
Biggs, M.A.R. (2002) Editorial: the concept 
of knowledge in art and design. Working 
Papers in Art and Design 2 Retrieved 





file:///S|/LIS%20SHARED/UHRA/PDFs%20-%20need%20staff%20permission/Biggs,%20M/101063.htm (1 of 2)04/01/2007 13:34:32
working papers in art and design, volume 2
language one uses to describe and frame the situation influences one's problem 
analysis. For example, Foucault reframed the historical concept of madness as an 
instrument of power rather than an instrument of health. Such observations raise 
anxieties about the relationship between concept formation and problem analysis. 
This is particularly pertinent in culturally situated domains such as art and design. 
Such observations about the relationship of language and concept formation may also 
be useful in explaining why styles and interpretations change while the basic material 
objects or evidence remain unchanged.
But do we feel comfortable when we say that artefacts constitute evidence, on the 
scientific model, and that when the paradigm shifts the causal nexus within which we 
describe artefacts and evidence also changes giving rise to new interpretations based 
on the same material evidence? If not, what is the evidence on which we base any 
argument in art and design?
Perhaps we feel inclined to reject this use of language to describe the activities in this 
field. Not that it is groundless, but that this voice establishes a set of rules that are 
inappropriate in terms of what we actually do within the practice of art and design. 
After all, how many practising artists set themselves explicit problems to answer? The 
interpretation of artefacts takes place in a cultural and social domain and the value of 
an artefact is not solely determined by its intrinsic properties or its contribution to 
socially recognised problems. The way it is consumed affects its interpretation.
This cultural reading would appear to prioritise the critic over the artist. Is a researcher 
really a critic or commentator? When somebody studies for a PhD in fine art are they 
training to be a critic rather than a leading practitioner? Students have said to me that 
they are concerned that doing a PhD might make them into worse practitioners. Is it 
the critics who advance knowledge in art and design?
This takes us to my final rhetorical question, the way that practice advances 
knowledge. What is it that is discovered and advanced through practice that is of 
benefit to those who experience the outcomes? It is one thing to learn or teach how to 
improve practice, a kind of technological improvement, the betterment of knowing-
how. But what aspect of practice enhances knowing-that and how is that 
communicated through the artefact?
Have we somehow conspired to arrange matters so that knowledge is always what 
we say about something rather than what we show about it? If so, it would account for 
the difficulty of using objects as constituting or communicating knowledge. Is the 
problem that the whole concept of knowledge and research arises out of words rather 
than actions, or do we simply have too narrow a range of examples, i.e. only lexical 
examples? Have we defined ourselves into a corner?
The core for me is a constructivist problem. Have we created our concept of 
knowledge through examples and peer recognition?: to which I think the answer is no. 
Or does our concept of knowledge arise as a result of the rationalist debate, as an 
abstract entity that is conceptually constituted rather than manifested and embodied in 
examples and experience? Does epistemology not only study the nature of 
knowledge but construct the concept of knowledge in the first place? This would 
certainly explain the apparent priority of the word over the artefact.
I am reminded of the anecdote about Samuel Johnson who was out walking with 
Boswell when he was told about the ideas of the philosophical sceptic Bishop 
Berkeley. Berkeley had shown that all our knowledge of the external world derives 
from sensory experience. Unfortunately, the evidence from our senses is unreliable, 
therefore we cannot "know" about the existence of matter. On hearing this, Johnson 
turned to a large stone and gave it a sound kick. "I refute it thus", he said. Was that a 
refutation, an argument presented through the use of an artefact? If it was, then we 
are all back in business. 
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